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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence are intended to signify Reason's triumph
over Emotion in the courtroom. In fact, the origin of evidentiary rules is often
directly tied to concerns over the jury's ability to render a verdict free of
+ Teaching Fellow, Federal Legislation and Administrative Clinic, Georgetown University Law
Center. Special thanks to Professors George Fisher and Laura Kalman, as well as to Anna Mariz,
Kelly Moser, Milana Prjean, Isaac Ruiz, and Atticus Talbot. A previous version of this paper
appeared in the 2008 Yale Law School Student Scholarship Series.
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inflamed passions.' This distrust of the jury's capacity for properly weighing
some types of evidence has deep roots in our legal system and expresses itself
in many of today's Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence,
first enacted in 1975 after several years of careful consideration, represent the
drafters' best effort to strike a delicate balance between the often competing
interests of admissibility and preventing unfair prejudice to parties. 2
This balance is largely preserved by the process established by the Rules
Enabling Act3 for the promulgation of federal court rules. Under the procedure
created by the Enabling Act, amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence
usually undergo a rigorously structured process that begins with the Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence, proceeds to the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, then to the Judicial Conference, and
ultimately to the Supreme Court.4 If the Court approves the amendment, the
proposal is transmitted to Congress for acceptance or rejection. 5 The overall
process has been described as conservative and slow, and it takes at least two
6to three years from start to finish. The detailed attention paid to any
amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence and the acquired expertise of
those proposing, analyzing, and recommending changes to the Rules help to
maintain the balance between admissibility and preventing unfair prejudice.
But that equilibrium is threatened. Though Congress has generally left the
process of amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to the procedures
prescribed in the Rules Enabling Act, lawmakers have directly amended the
1. Laura Gaston Dooley, Essay, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and
Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 337 (1995) (stating that "the Federal Rules of
Evidence rest on an assumption that the judge must protect the jury from certain evidence lest the
jurors allow their emotional reaction to overpower their intellectual obligation to decide the case
according to the judge's instructions"); Wallace D. Loh, The Evidence and Trial Procedure: The
Law, Social Policy, and Psychological Research, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE 13, 15 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) ("The need for any
rules.., is said to rest on three rationales: practical necessity, promotion of certain social values,
and distrust of the jury."); see also JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE 123 (Atheneum 1963) (1949) ("But there are other rules of exclusion which,
no matter what their origin, have been perpetuated primarily because of the admitted
incompetence ofjurors.").
2. See Michael S. Ellis, Comment, The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413,
414, and 415, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 961, 963 (1998).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2071-77 (2000).
4. See id. For a general summary of the process, see James C. Duff, Federal Rulemaking,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2008). Congress created
the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in 1922 to serve as the chief administration and policy-
making body for the United States Courts. Judge Robert H. Hall, Federal Circuit Judicial
Councils: A Legislative History and Revisions Needed Today, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
In 1948, Congress changed the name of this body to the Judicial Conference, but preserved the
administration of the United States Courts as its fundamental purpose. Id.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000).
6. Symposium, The Politics of[Evidence] Rulemaking, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 739 (2002)
[hereinafter Politics of Evidence Symposium] (comments of Judge Fem Smith).
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Rules several times. 7  Without exception, the process through which these
changes were made was a poor substitute for the cautious and deliberate
approach followed by the Judicial Conference and its committees, and the
Rules are the worse for it. What's more alarming, however, is that Congress
appears more inclined than ever to involve itself directly in the Rules through
legislation.8 Given this heightened interest in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
now is an appropriate time to analyze Congress's behavior with regard to the
Rules.
This brings me to the focus of the Article. Direct congressional involvement
in the Federal Rules of Evidence has always been a source of consternation
among legal scholars. 9  And yet missing from these works is a thorough
explanation as to why congressional efforts to amend the Federal Rules of
Evidence are so troubling. This Article attempts to offer an analysis of
Congress's actions regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence and to explain
why, on both a theoretical and practical level, direct congressional
participation in amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is problematic.
To do so, I begin by offering a brief description of the process through
which amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence are usually promulgated
through the Rules Enabling Act. This method of altering the Federal Rules of
Evidence, as we will see, is assiduous and thoughtful, offering a sharp contrast
to Congress's approach. In fact, this difference alone may justify the call for
Congress to refrain from directly involving itself in the upkeep of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. During just the past two sessions of Congress there have been efforts to codify the
attomey-client privilege (Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, S. 186 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R. 3013 110th Cong. (2007)), the doctor-patient privilege (Patients' Privacy Protection
Act of 2005, H.R. 6371, 109th Cong. (2006)), the parent-child privilege (Parent-Child Privilege
Act of 2005, H.R, 3433, 109th Cong. (2005)), and several efforts to amend hearsay rules related
to forfeiture for wrongdoing. See Violent Crime Control Act of 2007, S. 1860, § 723 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R. 3156, 1 10th Cong. § 723 (2007); Fighting Gangs and Empowering Youth Act of
2007, S. 990, 110th Cong. § 310 (2007); H.R. 1692, 110th Cong. § 310 (2007); Gang Deterrence
and Community Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 880 § 113, 110th Cong. (2007). Following the
Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993), Congress also considered a series of legislative proposals relating to the expert witness
rules-bills that "were so confused that they tried to both codify Daubert and codify Frye [Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)] simultaneously." Politics of Evidence
Symposium, supra note 6, at 742 (comments of Gregory Joseph) (footnote omitted).
9. See, e.g., Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 741-43 (comments of Paul
Rice and Gregory Joseph) (expressing opposing views regarding the extent of congressional
involvement in amending the Federal Rules of Evidence); Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist?
Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 (1997)
(criticizing Congress's amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence as related to the addition of
Rule 413); James Joseph Duane, The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused
Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted Version of a Very Bad Idea, 157 F.R.D. 95, 95 (1994) (finding
"most troublesome" the method by which the Rules were amended).
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Part III lays out a juror-centric understanding of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Concerns over the abilities of the jury to properly consider certain
types of evidence form the basis of evidentiary rules generally, and the Federal
Rules specifically. At the same time, juries are treated with a reverence
reserved for the most sacred of institutions. Appreciating the legal
profession's ambivalence toward the jury helps to explain the purpose and
function of the Rules. Moreover, in exploring the misgivings about juror
behavior that led to evidentiary rules, one sees that those same traits influence
congressional action involving the Rules of Evidence. Put simply, the Federal
Rules of Evidence are designed largely to prevent juries from relying on
inflamed passions, appeals to emotion, and flawed reasoning when rendering
verdicts, and yet these are the dominant features of congressional decision-
making with regards to the evidentiary rules.
Having put forward a juror-centric appreciation of the Rules, I turn to the
main task at hand: establishing why Congress should limit its involvement in
amending the Federal Rules of Evidence to affirming or rejecting changes
promulgated by the Judicial Conference and its committees. My argument
unfolds in three parts. To begin, I explore the many similarities that exist
between Congress and juries in an effort to understand how those similarities
help explain why the juror-centric concerns that form the basis for the Federal
Rules of Evidence are equally applicable to Congress. These include the
theoretical importance of the jury from the perspective of America's Founders,
as well as structural and process-oriented similarities. All of these qualities are
instructive in analyzing Congress's proper role in amending the Federal Rules
of Evidence-rules, it must be remembered, that were formulated largely
because of misgivings about juries.
Of course, examining past legislative involvement in the Rules provides the
most useful tool in demonstrating why Congress should refrain from directly
amendinf them. In 1994, Congress added Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415.0 These rules, which expanded the admissibility of prior-act evidence
in criminal and civil proceedings related to sexual crimes, demonstrate just
how susceptible lawmakers are to making decisions based on inflamed
passions, emotional appeals, and flawed reasoning. Ten years earlier, in
response to the public outcry over the acquittal of attempted presidential
assassin John Hinckley, Jr., Congress similarly acted to make ill-conceived
changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence to address concerns over the
testimony of mental health experts.1" As we shall see, these legislatively
imposed changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence were not only unnecessary
and unwise, but served to disrupt the fragile balance between admissibility and
guarding against unfair prejudice.
10. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
320935(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (adding FED. R. EVID. 413-15).
11. Congress added subsection (b) to Federal Rule of Evidence 704. Act of Oct. 12, 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 406, 98 Stat. 1837, 2067-68 (amending FED. R. EVID. 704).
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Part IV ends with an area of concern that cannot be ignored: the importance
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in protecting defendants from unfair verdicts.
Although many of the Rules are neutral on their face, in actuality, they are
premised on ensuring that a jury does not convict a defendant on a basis other
than a proper analysis of the factual evidence. 12 The balance achieved by the
Federal Rules of Evidence between admissibility and unfair prejudice is
focused primarily on this concern. Public-choice theory and concepts of
representation teach us, however, that congressional action with regard to the
Federal Rules of Evidence will almost invariably be aimed at disrupting this
balance at the expense of defendants. This not only raises constitutional
concerns, but jeopardizes the legitimacy of America's criminal trial system.
The best way to avoid these problems is for Congress to restrict its
involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Finally, recognizing that the suggestion that Congress should refrain from
legislating in an area unquestionably within its domain will be greeted with
skepticism, I end the Article with a brief section responding to anticipated
criticisms of my arguments.
Let me offer one caveat before moving forward. Some may read this Article
as an attack on juries or as a substantive critique of past congressional policy
decisions. This is not what I intend. It is certainly true that I am, like many in
the legal profession (and, perhaps, like many Americans), conflicted about the
role of the jury. I see the jury system's many faults, but also appreciate its
many virtues. But, ultimately, this article is not an attempt to assess the proper
place for juries in our legal system. Similarly, this Article is not an effort to
criticize Congress for policy decisions it has made in the past. The job of
offering substantive criticism of these past decisions has been done, and done
well.' 3 Instead, my purpose here is to provide important background relating
to the functional goals behind the Federal Rules of Evidence and to argue that
the juror-focused concerns underlying the Rules are equally applicable to
Congress's involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Only if Congress
removes itself from its threatened perch of amending the Rules of Evidence
will the delicate balance between admissibility and exclusion of unfairly
prejudicial evidence be preserved.
II. THE GENESIS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND THE PROCESS BY
WHICH THEY ARE AMENDED UNDER THE RULES ENABLING ACT
The starting point for analyzing congressional involvement in amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence is to understand how changes to the Rules are
usually adopted. Only then does one recognize how greatly congressionally
enacted amendments deviate from the standard practice.
12. See John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91 IOWA L. REv. 1209, 1248-49
(2006); see also supra note 1.
13. See supra note 9.
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The genesis of the Federal Rules of Evidence dates to the Rules Enabling
Act of 1934,14 which gave the Supreme Court the authority to promulgate rules
of practice and procedure. 5 Despite holding the power to draft evidentiary
rules as far back as 1934, the Supreme Court was originally in "no mood to
tinker with the law of evidence." Sensing this, the Judicial Conference and
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing
Committee) 7 focused its initial effort on promulgating the much-needed Rules
of Civil Procedure, with little attention paid to questions of evidence."8 The
1946 drafting of the Criminal Rules of Procedure also avoided tackling issues
of evidence. Efforts outside the Enabling Act structure to create uniform
rules of evidence also met with little success.
The first significant movement toward the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence came in 1961, when the Judicial Conference approved the creation of
a Special Committee on Evidence to examine the desirability of developing a
set of evidentiary rules for the federal courts.21 Two years later, the Special
Committee issued, and the Judicial Conference adopted, a report favoring the
22promulgation of federal evidence rules. The Judicial Conference created the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence (Advisory Committee)-a
committee that took Chief Justice Earl Warren nearly two years to assemble.
2 3
The Advisory Committee produced a set of proposed rules in the form of a
Preliminary Draft and, based on comments and suggestions to that draft, issued
a Revised Draft in 1970. 24 The Judicial Conference approved the Revised
Draft, sending it to the Supreme Court for final promulgation in accordance
with the Rules Enabling Act.25 Rather than taking action to finalize the Rules
of Evidence, the Supreme Court sent the Revised Draft back to the Judicial
14. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2071-77 (2000)).
15. 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE § 5002, at 71-72 (2d ed. 2005).
16. Id. § 5002, at 75.
17. The Rules Enabling Act mandated that the Judicial Conference authorize appointment of
the Standing Committee. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (2000).
18. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee offered only two rules touching on evidence
law-what are now Civil Rules 43 and 44, which, respectively, set forth a general principle of
inclusion and established a rule for proving an official record. See 10 JAMES WM. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 5[5], at 30-31 (2d ed. 1996).
19. Id. §9.
20. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
A POCKET CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT LAW (1st ed. 1910); THE NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE (1953).
21. 21 WRIGHT&GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5006, at 171.
22. Id § 5006, at 179-80.
23. Id. § 5006, at 180.
24. Id. § 5006, at 186-87.
25. Id. § 5006, at 187, 193 n.130.
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Conference for publication and comment prior to official promulgation.2 6
After adopting a number of changes pressed by the Department of Justice, the
Judicial Conference again forwarded the proposed rules to the Supreme
Court.2 7 On November 20, 1972, the Supreme Court approved the Federal
Rules of Evidence, authorizing Chief Justice Warren Burger to transmit them
to Congress.
28
While both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure became effective after Congress took no action within
ninety days following transmittal from the Supreme Court,29 the Federal Rules
of Evidence sparked more controversy, largely because they were labeled
"substantive" and contained rules of privilege. 30 Congress, therefore, enacted
legislation that provided that the Rules would not become effective until
expressly approved by Congress and signed by the President. 31  Intense
lobbying over the proposed rules of privilege and the precise language of
several other rules led to several modifications. 32 After a House and Senate
Conference Committee ironed out differences between the two chambers'
versions of the rules, Congress approved the new Federal Rules of Evidence in
December 1974.33 President Ford signed the legislation on January 2, 1975,
making the Rules effective on July 1, 1975. 34
The process of promulgating new rules or amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence generally flows upstream. It begins with the Advisory Committee
on Rules of Evidence, 35 which studies the rules and is the initial source of
proposed changes. 36 The Advisory Committee is made up of twelve members
of the legal community, representing the judiciary, trial attorneys, and the
26. Id. § 5006, at 187. The Conference's Revised Draft was published at 51 F.R.D. 315
(1971).
27. 21 WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5006, at 191.
28. Id. § 5006, at 193. This was done over the dissent of Justice William Douglas, who
contended that the substance of the proposed rules exceeded the scope of the Rules Enabling Act,
and the Court lacked the competency to pass them. Id. § 5006, at 193 & n. 129.
29. STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 4 (9th ed.
2006).
30. Id.
31. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
32. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5006, at 197. The proposed rules of privilege
were struck from the final version of the Rules. Id. § 5006, at 200.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
35. The Supreme Court disbanded the Advisory Committee on Evidence following
submission of the proposed rules to Congress in 1973. See SALTZBERG ET AL., supra note 29, at
7. In response to repeated calls from the legal community, the Judicial Conference reestablished
the Advisory Committee in 1993. Id.
36. Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 738 (comments of Judge Fern Smith).
Judge Smith was the chair of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence from 1996 to 1999.
Id. at 733.
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Department of Justice.37 The Committee is expected to "carry on a continuous
study of the operation and effect" of the Federal Rules of Evidence.38 From
the Advisory Committee, a proposal goes to the Standing Committee, which
may approve the rule for public hearing and comment. After the public
weighs in, and if the Standing Committee supports the rule, it is sent to the
Judicial Conference.40  Once the Judicial Conference endorses the proposed
change, the Supreme Court receives it.4 1 Assuming the Court approves the
rule, it is transmitted to Congress for acceptance or rejection. 42
The evidentiary rulemaking process is inherently conservative.43 To the
chagrin of some scholars,44 amending the Federal Rules of Evidence is "time
consuming"-taking at least two to three years to complete. 45 Moreover, the
Advisory Committee is said to take the "if it ain't broke, don't fix it"
46 47approach. While some scholars may be critical of this slow pace, the time
it takes to amend the Rules is better recognized as a demonstration of the
deliberation and thoughtfulness put into any substantive changes to the Rules
of Evidence. Indeed, this approach is preferable to rash and ill-considered
changes.
The careful process contemplated by the Rules Enabling Act, however, can
be ignored by Congress at will. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part
IV, when Congress decides to directly amend the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the process is anything but deliberative and thoughtful. Rather, congressional48
action with regard to the Rules is often based on reactions to major events or
37. Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik William Delker, Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 684 n.62 (2000).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2000).
39. Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 738 (comments of Judge Fern Smith).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence: Tending
to the Past and Pretending for the Future?, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 817, 838 (2002) ("Law by
committee, particularly through the bureaucratized process under the Rules Enabling Act, is
inherently less responsive and vital .... ). Professor Rice has also led the charge to encourage
major changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence through the Evidence Project Report, a thorough
compilation of proposed revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, with accompanying
commentary. See The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
171 F.R.D. 330 (1997), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/journals/evidence/toc.
html.
45. Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 739 (comments of Judge Fern Smith).
46. Rice, supra note 44, at 823.
47. See, e.g., id (calling the slow amendment process "perverse").
48. See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, A Recipe for Confusion: Congress and the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 691, 692-93 (2001) (describing congressional reaction to "a few
poster child cases in which evidence of a defendant's prior sexual assaults was excluded from
trial").
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out of desires to appeal to constituencies. Further, congressional hearings are
rarely held, debate is limited, and the comments and concerns of the legal
community are largely ignored.5 ° Put simply, the rushed and politically driven
congressional process for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence stands in
stark contrast to the Advisory Committee's careful development of the Rules.
Understanding these differences is the aim of the remainder of this Article.
III. DEVELOPING A JUROR-CENTRIC RATIONALE FOR THE FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE
As with many codes of law, the Federal Rules of Evidence signify a broad,
ambitious effort to establish a general framework to promote an effective and
efficient legal process. In part because of the breadth of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, scholars often find it useful to develop an analytic framework for
studying the Rules that recognizes the important functional differences among
the various provisions.51
Toward that end, there are a variety of approaches that one may take to
explain and categorize the Federal Rules of Evidence. The structure of the
Rules themselves offers the most obvious starting point for understanding how
each rule operates in relation to the others. They are divided into eleven
Articles,52 offering a functional breakdown of the Rules. Of course, even
without this self-categorization, it would be relatively easy to discern the
function of each Rule. Nevertheless, the groupings by Article do offer some
insight into how the drafters viewed the operation of particular Rules.
53
A refined method divides the Rules into slightly more dynamic categories of
understanding: relevancy, reliability, exclusions, and administration.54 This
perspective allows one to anticipate the critical issues that may arise with a
49. See Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 741-42 (comments of Paul Rice).
50. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. 15208 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes) (observing the lack
of formal review, hearings, and debate).
51. See, e.g., CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 1.1, at
2-3 (7th ed. 1992) (instructing that an attorney should "routinely appl[y] a consistent analytical
approach"); SALTZBURG, supra note 29, at xv-xxvi (dividing the Rules into groups for greater
practical explanation).
52. Article I (General Provisions), Article II (Judicial Notice), Article III (Presumptions in
Civil Actions and Proceedings), Article IV (Relevancy and Its Limits), Article V (Privileges),
Article VI (Witnesses), Article VII (Opinions and Expert Testimony), Article VIII (Hearsay),
Article IX (Authentication and Identification), Article X (Contents of Writings, Recordings, and
Photographs), and Article XI (Miscellaneous Rules). FED. R. EVID., at xi-xiv (Table of
Contents).
53. For example, Rule 610's exclusion of evidence regarding the religious views of
witnesses is placed in Article VI (Witnesses), rather than Article IV (Relevancy and Its Limits),
which informs courts that the Rule states an absolute requirement of exclusion that is not subject
to the balancing test of Rule 403. 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6152, at 310 (3d ed. 1993).
54 Credit belongs to Professor George Fisher for offering such a framework during the
course he teaches on evidence.
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given Rule and to better understand how the Rules interact with one another to
promote functionality. Taking this approach even further, one can get to the
core issue of the Federal Rules of Evidence by dividing the Rules into those
that are inclusionary, and therefore widen the scope of admissible evidence and
into those that are exclusionary, thereby serving to restrict the scope of
admissible evidence. This approach illustrates the basic function of the
Federal Rules of Evidence: establishing what evidence gets admitted and what
evidence does not. Examining the Rules as either inclusionary or exclusionary
helps to place each rule in its proper context.
Dean Wallace Loh has offered a more imaginative rubric for understanding
the function of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 55 He places the rules into the
following categories: (1) "[R]ules that pertain[] to communicators"; (2) Rules
that "address the nature and presentation of the communication"; (3) Rules that
cover "the admission or exclusion of [particular tpes of] evidence"; and (4)
"[R]ules that guide the deliberation[] of the jury." Dean Loh believes that
dividing the Rules as he does helps to explain each Rule's design and
importance by focusing on the type and form of evidence at issue.
5 7
I have offered only a very brief discussion of the various approaches to
analyzing the Federal Rules of Evidence, but each provides an important and
useful perspective for breaking down and better understanding the Rules. At
the same time, these schemes are focused largely on the subject matter of each
Rule, rather than on each Rule's impetus. They therefore fail to address
important motivating factors for the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and ignore one primary catalyst for development of evidentiary rules-the
legal profession's love-hate relationship with the jury.58  As I will discuss
55. See Loh, supra note 1, at 14-15.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 13-19.
58. See supra note 1. See also John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of
Evidence: A View From the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1169, 1172, 1194 (1996)
("From the Middle Ages to our own day, the driving concern animating the Anglo-American law
of evidence has been to protect against the shortcomings of trial by jury."). Professor Langbein
offers important insights into the origins of evidentiary rules by reviewing the judge's notes of Sir
Dudley Ryder, Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1754-1756. Id. at 1172. According to
Professor Langbein, Chief Justice Ryder's notes reveal that the modem law of evidence "was
largely nonexistent as late as the middle decades of the eighteenth century." Id. Because the jury
system can be traced as far back as the twelfth century, Professor Langbein calls the effort to tie
the development of evidentiary law to the origins of the jury "awkward." Id. at 1169-70. Indeed,
Professor Langbein makes a strong case that the advance of modern evidentiary law is more
directly related to the development of adversary criminal procedures in the late eighteenth
century. Id. at 1197-1200. Adversary procedure pushed judges toward a more neutral role in the
trial than they had otherwise occupied. Id. at 1198. This, in turn, gave the jury more control over
determining the outcome of trials. Id. at 1198-99. Furthermore, the nature of the form of
evidence proffered by parties transitioned from written to oral. Id. at 1183-84. Evidentiary rules
prior to these developments were limited largely to questions relating to written evidence and the
best evidence rule. Id. at 1173-74. As oral testimony replaced written evidence as the dominant
means of conveying information to the jury, evidentiary standards in the form of exclusionary
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below, the Federal Rules of Evidence are chiefly inspired or perpetuated by a
distrust of the jury.59 In fact, evidentiary rules in general exist principally out
of a belief that jurors cannot be relied upon to give proper consideration to
certain types of evidence. As I will more fully develop, recognizing that this
motivation underlies many of the evidentiary rules helps to explain why
Congress should refrain from direct intervention in the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
Legal professionals have long harbored misgivings about the ability of jurors
to limit their reliance on evidence to the particular purposes for which that
evidence is admitted. Moreover, there is-and always has been-a fear that
jurors are susceptible to allowing passions and emotions to determine the
outcome of legal proceedings. 6 1 Indeed, juries have been labeled "stupid," and
"capricious," and treated as if they are "low grade morons." 62 Jerome Frank,
the respected jurist, devoted multiple chapters in his classic work Courts on
Trial to the problems of the jury system and stated that "the jury is the worst
possible enemy of [the] ideal of the 'supremacy of [the] law.' 63  Frank
suggested that jurors make decisions "according to arbitrary will" and "their
worst prejudices," and that the jury system "almost completely wipes out the
principle of 'equality before the law."' 64  Frank noted that his concerns
regarding the jury were shared by such notables as James Bradley Thayer,
Judge Learned Hand, and Justice Cardozo.
65
In fact, the American legal profession's ambivalence toward the jury can be
traced as far back as this nation's founding. On one hand, the Founders
believed that juries represented popular control over the judiciary. 66 Duringthe debate over ratification of the Constitution, both Federalists and Anti-
rules developed to keep the jury in line. Id. at 1196. Thus, although the modem law of evidence
did not appear at the same time as the jury system, it remains true that evidentiary rules arose out
of concerns over juries' abilities to properly weigh certain types of evidence. Id. at 1194.
59. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, 1248-49.
60. Professor Leubsdorf discusses the jury-centered basis for a number of evidentiary rules,
including those that control expert evidence, hearsay, character evidence, and even the
authentication requirement (stating that "Wigmore ascribes even the authentication requirement
to the tendency of credulous jurors to accept any document placed before them at its full apparent
value"). Id. at 1248-49.
61. See infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text (discussing early English and American
case law demonstrating concerns about juries).
62. Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 6 (1942) (Morgan states
that "[t]he charge is seldom made that modem juries are corrupt, but complaints of stupid and
capricious action are frequent. The low intellectual capacity of the jury is commonly put forward
to justify some, if not all, of our exclusionary rules."). Morgan disagreed with this common
assessment of the jury. Id. at 6-7.
63. FRANK, supra note 1, at 132.
64. Id. (first internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 124.
66. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text (discussing early American concepts of
the jury).
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Federalists embraced the importance of the jury.67 Even champions of the
common man's role in the judiciary, however, had serious misgivings about
juries. Take for example that "quintessential democrat, radical leader, and
enlightened law reformer," Thomas Jefferson. 68 Legal scholars-and, in fact,
even the Supreme Court-have often quoted Jefferson's statement that, "Were
I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the
Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out
of the Legislative." 69  This, however, is hardly a complete picture of
Jefferson's view of juries. Rather, Jefferson harbored serious misgivings about
the role of juries "because they could be beguiled and seduced by emotional,
irrational appeals. '70 In fact, Jefferson's endorsement of juries seems based
more on his distrust of "biased" Federalist judges than on any virtues he
believed juries inherently possessed. 71 And while Jefferson certainly preferred
the "common sense of '12 honest men' over that of "a judge whose mind is
warped by any motive whatever," Jefferson nevertheless considered the
likelihood of a jury's reaching a correct outcome as not much greater than
72
chance. Indeed, even as Jefferson articulated a preference for jurors over
judges, he recognized that a juror's "'ignorance [may] render[ him] pliable to
the will and designs of power."' 73 Thus, the current ambivalence toward the
jury that pervades the legal profession is easily traced as far back as our
nation's founding.
The legal profession's concern that juries lead to "arbitrary injustice"
continues to this day. 74 At the same time, both historically and today, the jury
67. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
68. Daniel D. Blinka, Jefferson and Juries: The Problem of Law, Reason, and Politics in the
New Republic, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35, 37 (2005).
69. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004) (quoting Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to the Abb6 Arnoux (July 19, 1789), reprinted in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 282, 283 (Julian P. Boyd & William H. Gaines, Jr. eds., 1958)); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1188 (1991); Vikram David Amar, Jury
Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 221 n.105 (1995);
Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an Era of
Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 57 (2003); William P. Quigley, The Necessity
Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 3, 64 n.224
(2003); Daniel C. Richman, Essay, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away Prosecutorial
Accountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 969 (1997).
70. Blinka, supra note 68, at 37.
71. Id. at38,98-99.
72. Id. at 98-99 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 130
(William Peden ed., Norton 1972) (1787)). Jefferson actually compared jury decisions with
"cross and pile"--an eighteenth century game equivalent to a coin toss. Id.
73. Id. at 101 (quoting 2 THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON, 1776-1826, at 1077 (James Morton Smith ed.,
1995)).
74. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 325. In fact, Professor Dooley discusses how the disdain
for the jury has been building recently both in the legal profession and among the citizenry. She
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is held in lofty esteem-a body in which enormous faith is placed. 75  For
example, that reliance can be seen not only in the fact that the jury is provided
for in three of the first ten Amendments to the Constitution,76 but also in how
we have shaped our legal framework with the role of the jury in mind. For
instance, despite evidence to the contrary, jurors are believed to be able to
correctly discern truth-tellers from perjurers. 77  They are expected to
understand and abide by jury instructions and to accurately apply the law to the
facts.78  And, once a jury has heard from a witness, the determination of
whether that person told the truth rests exclusively in the jury's hands.79
Thus, as one scholar has noted, Americans-including those in the legal
profession-can truly be said to have a love-hate relationship with the jury.80
Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence, perhaps more than any other legal
undertaking, demonstrate the profession's ambivalence toward the jury. For
this reason, and because the Rules are inspired in large part by a distrust of the
jury, it is important to keep this juror-centric motivation in mind when
examining the function and purpose behind them. Of course, appreciating this
fact not only respects the historical basis for the evidentiary rules, but also
assists in the main task at hand: analyzing Congress's involvement in
amending the Federal Rules.
As I have stated, the evidentiary rules are generally shaped by a distrust of
the jury.81 Some rules, of course, are more directly tied to misgivings about
the jury than others. These rules are properly labeled "juror-centric": meaning
that even with an understanding that evidentiary rules as a whole were inspired
in part by concerns over juries, there are particular Rules that are based almost
documents and analyzes modem judicial opinions, legal scholarship, and the popular press to
demonstrate the cultural fear of the jury as irrational. See generally id.
75. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V-VII.
77. See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 577-78 (1997).
78. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 1251-52.
79. Fisher, supra note 77, at 577. Juries originally were not permitted to settle issues of
witness credibility, but instead were expected to treat all testimony as truthful. Id. at 580. While
perhaps absurd by today's standards, this approach was made possible because of the tremendous
faith that was historically placed in the ability of the swom oath to produce truthful testimony. Id.
Professor Fisher also traces the process through which the jury rose from this historic role as truth
acceptor to its current inception as "lie detector." Id. at 581. In documenting this "evolutionary
process," Professor Fisher makes note of two important facts: that it was remarkably slow and
that it "was not principled" or "driven by a conviction that the jury can and should resolve
credibility conflicts," but that instead "faith in the jury's powers of lie detection only followed the
force of events." Id. Thus, even the authority juries hold today came less from intrinsic belief in
their abilities than it does from other considerations. See id.
80. Dooley, supra note 1, at 329.
81. Interestingly, legal systems in which judges generally are responsible for rendering
verdicts often have limited or no rules of evidence. Kenneth Williams, Do We Really Need the
Federal Rules of Evidence?, 74 N.D. L. REv. 1, 22-24 (1998) (describing the systems employed
in France, Germany, and the International Tribunals).
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exclusively on such juror-focused fears. The Rule of Evidence that most
unmistakably displays the legal profession's concerns about juries is Rule
403.82 As Professor Edward Imwinkelried has stated:
Underlying Rule 403 is a model of optimal jury behavior. Ideally,
we want the jury to: use admitted items of evidence as proof of only
the factual propositions the judge admits them to prove, ascribe the
proper probative weight to each item of evidence, and concentrate on
the historical issues in dispute in the case.
83
Rule 403 is a demonstration of distrust in the jury's ability to meet this model
of behavior; otherwise the rule would not be necessary.
84
Indeed, nearly every discussion of the policy behind Rule 403 centers on the
rule's purpose of preventing unfair prejudice to a partY that can occur when a
jury inappropriately uses certain types of evidence. 5 In each example of
unfair prejudice, Weinstein and Berger incorporate the jury.86 This approach
82. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
83. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS § 5.01, at 205-06 (7th ed.
2008).
84. So important is Rule 403 that it has been called the "cornerstone" of the entire Federal
Rules of Evidence. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the
Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 497 & n.5 (1983). And this
cornerstone has ancient roots. Thayer traced it to the thirteenth century. See JAMES BRADLEY
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 516 (1898). A rule
calling for the exclusion of evidence out of fear of its effects on the jury was formulated at least
as early as the late 1600s. See, e.g., Trial of Ambrose Rookwood, (1696) 13 Howell's St. Trials
139, 209-12 (K.B.) (excluding evidence that might lead to juror confusion). Concerns over a
piece of evidence's tendency to inflame passions of the jury are also deeply rooted. See, e.g.,
People v. Dye, 16 P. 537, 539-40 (Cal. 1888) (excluding evidence that would expose the
defendant to jurors' contempt); People v. Corey, 42 N.E. 1066, 1071 (N.Y. 1896) (excluding
evidence regarding the defendant's syphilis because it might arouse jurors' passions and create a
feeling of antipathy toward the defendant).
85. See, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181-82 (1997) (noting that evidence
should be excluded if it could cause a jury to convict on the basis that "'a bad person deserves
punishment' (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982))); United States
v. Astling, 733 F.2d 1446, 1457 (11 th Cir. 1984) (observing that emotional evidence might lead a
jury to an irrational decision); see also I JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A, BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403App.01[l]-[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2007)
(providing historical analysis and policy background); I JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 21, at 931-34 (Peter Tillers rev., Little, Brown & Co. 1983) (stating
that the proper approach "focuses on the probable effect... on the jury's deliberations"); I A id. §
28, at 975 ("[T]he trial judge [has] extensive discretionary power to exclude relevant evidence for
reasons such as ... undue prejudice .... ").
86. Weinstein and Berger provide examples of the policies underlying Rule 403:
Evidence such as the following has been found unfairly prejudicial:
" Evidence that appeals to the jury's sympathies.
* Evidence that arouses jurors' sense of horror....
* Evidence that provokes a jury's instinct to punish.
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comports with the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 403, which explain:
"'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one." 87 In fact, any doubt that distrust of juries forms the basis for
Rule 403's unfair prejudice exclusion should be dispelled because the Rule's
unfair prejudice protections are arguably inapplicable in bench trials without
juries. 88  Thus, the Advisory Committee, the courts, and legal scholars all
recognize that Rule 403's primary concern is with a jury's ability to properly
consider evidence that may inflame its passions or otherwise unfairly prejudice
the jury's decisions.
Examining the historical basis of the remaining Federal Rules of Evidence
reveals that many of them can also rightly be labeled juror-centric. For
example, Rule 40489 is based on the same jury-focused concerns as those of
" Evidence that triggers other intense human reactions.
" The appellate court may also conclude that "unfair prejudice" occurred
because an insufficient effort was made at trial to avoid the dangers of
prejudice.
2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 85, § 403.04[l][c] (footnotes omitted). Indeed, Weinstein
and Berger state that "[u]nfaimess may be found in any form of evidence that may cause a jury to
base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case." 2 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.04[l][b] (Joseph
M. McLaughlin ed., 1998).
87. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's notes.
88. See, e.g., Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Adopting the position
taken in Gulf States, we hold that in the context of a bench trial, evidence should not be excluded
under 403 on the ground that it is unfairly prejudicial."); Gulf States Util. Co. v. Ecodyne Corp.,
635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981) (The court held that "[t]he exclusion of this
evidence under Rule 403's weighing of probative value against prejudice was improper. This
portion of Rule 403 has no logical application to bench trials").
89. Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides:
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of
character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of Accused. In a criminal case, evidence of a pertinent trait of
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if
evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an
accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character
of the accused offered by the prosecution;
(2) Character of Alleged Victim. In a criminal case, and subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the
alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
Catholic University Law Review
Rule 403.90 The Supreme Court noted in Michelson v. United States that the
common-law tradition excluded propensity evidence to establish guilt.9' As
the Court stated, such evidence "is not rejected because character is irrelevant;
on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him
a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge."
92
These two Rules, 403 and 404, are the Rules mostly directly tied to concerns
over a jury's ability to weigh evidence. They are the quintessential juror-
centric rules in that they are designed to exclude evidence otherwise admissible
out of a fear over the effect such evidence may have on the jury's decision-
making.
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses
pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404.
90. See, e.g., Old Chief 519 U.S. at 181-82 (stating that Rule 404(b) reflects the same
common-law tradition as Rule 403); 1 GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185,
at 737-38 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) ("[E]vidence of convictions for prior, unrelated
crimes might lead a juror to think that since the defendant already has a criminal record, an
erroneous conviction would not be quite as serious as it would otherwise be."); Gold, supra note
84, at 524-25 (noting the similarities between Rules 403 and 404).
91. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948).
92. Id. at 475-76 (footnote omitted).
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The exclusionary Rules 407, 9' 408,94  409, 9' 410,96  411,9' and
93. Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that,
if taken previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence
of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a
defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or
feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407.
94. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides:
(a) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of the following is not admissible on behalf of any
party, when offered to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of a claim that was
disputed as to validity or amount, or to impeach through a prior inconsistent statement
or contradiction:
(1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish-or accepting or offering or
promising to accept-a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to
compromise the claim; and
(2) conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding the claim,
except when offered in a criminal case and the negotiations related to a claim by a
public office or agency in the exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority.
(b) Permitted Uses. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence is offered
for purposes not prohibited by subdivision (a). Examples of permissible purposes
include proving a witness's bias or prejudice; negating a contention of undue delay; and
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
FED. R. EVID. 408.
95. Federal Rule of Evidence 409 provides: "Evidence of furnishing or offering or
promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible
to prove liability for the injury." FED. R. EVID. 409.
96. Federal Rule of Evidence 410 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any
civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or
was a participant in the plea discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding
either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for
the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a
plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another
statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced
and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.
FED. R. EVID. 410.
97. Federal Rule of Evidence 411 provides:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible
upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This rule
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41298 are all also based, at least in part, on concerns over the jury's use of
certain types of evidence. 99 And it is not just exclusionary rules that fit within
the category of "juror-centric" rules. The Federal Rules concerning expert
does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered
for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice
of a witness.
FED. R. EVID. 411.
98. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Evidence generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in
any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as
provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) In a criminal case, the following evidence is admissible, if otherwise
admissible under these rules:
(A) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the source of semen,
injury or other physical evidence;
(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim
with respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the
accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and
(C) evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights
of the defendant.
(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible
under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged
victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the
alleged victim.
FED. R. EVID. 412 (a)-(b).
99. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 1248-49; see also Columbia & Puget Sound Ry. Co. v.
Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (stating that the concept behind excluding subsequent
remedial measures is, in part, that such evidence "is calculated to distract the minds of the jury
from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant"); FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory
committee's note (such evidence "would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds"); I
EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 212 (1961) ("But the chief reason for
preventing reception of the evidence [of insurance policies] is the supposed inclination of jurors
to make the insurance company bear the loss because it has been paid for taking the risk, it is well
able to pay, and it will spread the loss among its policy holders."); 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER,
supra note 85, § 408.02 (discussing the purposes behind Rule 408); 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 15, §§ 5282, 5362 (Supp. 2008) (discussing the policy rationale of Rules 407 and
411).
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testimony-Rules 702,"00 703,10' and 704102-are also crafted with an eye
toward limiting juror use of certain forms of evidence.'0 3 As such, these rules
are also properly labeled juror-centric.10 4
Additionally, Rule 610,105 many of Article VIII's hearsay rules, and even the
authenticity rules of Article IX, relate (in part) to concerns of how jurors will
use particular types and forms of evidence. 06
100. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or otherwise specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
101. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting
the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
FED. R. EVtD. 703.
102. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of
the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier
of fact alone.
FED. R. EVID. 704.
103. See Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the
Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON
HALL L. REV. 881, 907-08 (2003) (challenging the assumption that juries must be protected from
expert opinion).
104. This is not to say that other policy considerations did not factor into the adoption of
these Rules. A review of each Rule's advisory committee notes reveals as much. Nevertheless, I
brand these rules "juror-centric" because the manner in which they operate is to keep otherwise
admissible evidence out of the hands of the jury, in large part because of misgivings about how
the jury would use such information.
105. Federal Rule of Evidence 610 provides: "Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a
witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their
nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced." FED. R. EVID. 610.
106. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 1248-49; see also 28 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 53,
§ 6152 (identifying concerns about jury treatment of information related to the witness's religious
faith).
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Knowing the legal profession's ambivalence toward the jury and the
historical roots of that uneasiness, one begins to see what the drafters were
attempting to accomplish by incorporating those concerns into the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Simply put, the primary purpose was to ensure that the
jury would render a verdict largely free of emotion and passion-a verdict
based only on a reasoned analysis of the facts properly before it.1°7 The
drafters' goal, therefore, was to achieve balance between admissibility and
unfair prejudice. This was not an easy task to accomplish given that the central
concept of the Rules is one of inclusiveness, while, of course, the very purpose
of trials is to ensure fairness, equality, and the "right" outcome.' 0 8 To achieve
this sought-after balance, the drafters constructed rules that, while generally
favoring admissibility, created categories of exclusion aimed at the evidence
considered most likely to inflame the jury's passions and emotions. The
drafters also included the catchall provision of Rule 403 as a means of
excluding the most prejudicial evidence. 1°9 In fact, one could rightly view the
balancing test of Rule 403 as an embodiment of the drafters' own need to
harmonize the often competing interests of admissibility and unfair prejudice.
As a whole, therefore, the Federal Rules of Evidence can be said to strike a
careful and deliberate balance of competing concepts that form the foundation
of our legal system. On the one hand, the jury lies at the heart of the American
trial as the people's representative within the judiciary, and great faith is placed
in its ability to discern truthful from untruthful testimony. 110 On the other
hand, the very basis of evidentiary rules is significant distrust over the jury's
ability to properly weigh certain types of evidence while reaching a verdict of
reason, free of emotion. The Federal Rules of Evidence seek to balance the
opposing goals of promoting liberal admissibility of evidence with the need to
exclude certain evidence out of fear of unfair prejudice.
The Federal Rules of Evidence may best be imagined as a textual version of
the Lady Justice: delicately balancing the counterweights of admissibility and
exclusions. As with any scale so carefully calibrated, even the lightest of
touches may disrupt that balance. However, Congress's involvement in the
Federal Rules of Evidence has been hardly delicate or light.
IV. THE CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
It is appropriate now, after laying out a juror-centric rationalization for the
Federal Rules of Evidence, to explain more fully why Congress should limit its
involvement in the Rules to ratifying or rejecting proposals adopted by the
107. See Gold, supra note 84, at 503-06; Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 1250-51.
108. See infra note 110 (discussing that the "right" outcome does not necessarily mean the
outcome that comports with the actual events that led to the trial).
109. See Gold, supra note 84, at 497, 503, 505.
110. See Fisher, supra note 77, at 577.
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Judicial Conference and its committees. My reasoning rests on both
theoretical and practical considerations, all of which are intrinsically tied to the
juror-centric view of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Recent examples of
congressional interference with the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, offer
the most instructive means of showing just how problematic such involvement
can be. The two instances I discuss, the addition of Rules 413-415 and the
addition of subsection (b) to Rule 704, both show how susceptible lawmakers
are to the very behaviors that the Rules attempt to eliminate from trials. The
inflamed passions, faulty reasoning, and outcome-oriented decision-making
that pervade congressional actions involving the evidentiary rules provide
strong support for the suggestion that Congress remove itself from the process
of direct intervention in amending the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Finally, one of the important functions of the Federal Rules of Evidence is to
ensure defendants receive a fair trial, one in which the jury reaches the "right"
outcome for the "right" reason.11' The careful balance between admissibility
and prevention of unfair prejudice is jeopardized if Congress directly amends
the Rules-especially if it does so with a particular outcome in mind. Not only
do such changes pose constitutional concems, but they also threaten the
perceived legitimacy of our legal system.
For all of these reasons, Congress should refrain from directly amending the
Rules and should instead limit its involvement to adopting or rejecting those
changes proposed by the Judicial Conference and forwarded to Congress by
the Supreme Court.
A. Theoretical and Practical Similarities Between Juries and Congress
America's Founders held strong views regarding the importance of the jury.
As Professor Akhil Amar has noted, juries are mentioned in no fewer than
three of the ten amendments constituting the Bill of Rights,'' 2 and are also
provided for in Article III's requirement that "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except
in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."' 3 In short, "juries were at the
heart of the Bill of Rights."
114
The importance of the jury to the Founders was rooted in a strongly held
belief that juries embody popular control within the judiciary.' 5 Put another
111. I place quotation marks around "right" because I wish to distinguish between truth-
verifying outcomes (verdicts that comport with the actual events giving rise to the trial) and
verdicts that satisfy our desired goals of fairness and justice (verdicts that seem truthful). See
Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts,
98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1362 (1985). It is the latter concern to which I am referring.
112. Akhil Amar, supra note 69, at 1190; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V-VII.
113. U.S. CONST. art. IIl,§ 2, ci. 3.
114. Akhil Amar, supra note 69, at 1183.
115. See, e.g., Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 15 (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 315, 320 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) ("If the conduct of judges
shall be severe and arbitrary, and tend to subvert the laws, and change the forms of government,
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way, jurors are the people's representatives within the judicial branch just as
congressmen and senators are the people's representatives within the
legislature. In fact, the idea of common control over the judicial branch was so
important during the time of our nation's founding that the failure of the
Constitutional Convention to provide a guarantee of civil trial b, jury in the
original document stoked considerable opposition to ratification.1 6 The Anti-
Federalist Federal Farmer wrote that:
The jury trial . . . is by far the most important feature in the judicial
department in a free country, and the right in question is far the most
valuable part, and the last that ought to be yielded, of this trial.
Juries are constantly and frequently drawn from the body of the
people, and freemen of the country; and by holding the jury's right to
return a general verdict in all cases sacred, we secure to the people at
large, their just and rightful controul in the judicial department....
This, and the democratic branch in the legislature, ... are the means
by which the people are let into the knowledge of public affairs-are
enabled to stand as guardians of each others [sic] rights, and to
restrain, by regular and legal measures, those who otherwise might
infringe upon them.' 17
Federalists agreed with-or at least accepted-the notion of the jury as the
people's representative within the judiciary and as a protector of liberty.1" 8
John Adams wrote that "the common people, should have as complete a
control ... in every judgment of a court of judicature" as in the legislature.' 19
It was this shared view of the jury, even among political opponents, that placed
the jury at the center of the Bill of Rights. To this day, the concept of the jury
the jury may check them...."); THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 458-60 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H.
Scott ed., 1898) (noting use of the jury for civil cases in the states at the time); see also Akhil
Amar, supra note 69, at 1183-85, 1187-89 (discussing the centrality of juries to the Bill of
Rights).
116. See Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 15, supra note 115, at 319-22 (asserting that the
failure to guarantee civil trial by jury rendered the proposed Constitution "of little or no
importance"); THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 115, at 453 ("The
objection to the plan of the Convention, which has met with most success in this State [New
York], is relative to the want ofa constitutional provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.").
117. Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 15, supra note 115, at 320 (footnote omitted).
118. In responding to Federal Farmer, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the Convention, if they agree in nothing else,
concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury. Or if there is any difference
between them, it consists in this; the former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty,
the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 115, at 456.
119. 2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 253 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850).
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as representatives of the people maintains its importance in our legal
framework. 120
Even beyond the theoretical, republican underpinnings of the role of the
jury, there are basic structural similarities between juries and Congress. For
example, prior to being empanelled, potential jurors are first questioned by
attorneys and the judge through voir dire. 21 Based on the answers to these
questions, individuals are either rejected or selected to serve on the jury.122
This process can be viewed as the judicial branch's equivalent to the election
of Congress. Potential office-holders are quizzed by each other, the media, and
citizens and, on Election Day, are rejected or selected to serve in Congress.
Once on a jury, a juror has tremendous authority and ultimate responsibility
for deciding the outcome of a case. Nevertheless, a set of rules constrain a
jury's authority. Obviously, the Federal Rules of Evidence restrict the
information a jury may hear before rendering its verdict, and a jury is expected
to follow the law as explained to it by the judge. 23 In addition, there are a
number of ways in which the jury's ultimate authority may be restricted in civil
proceedings, through procedural devices such as the Judgment as a Matter of
Law, 124 a motion for a new trial,125 or the concept of remittitur. 126 These
constraints are comparable to the checks and balances that limit Congress's
authority, as well as the various other institutional rules, such as the
127 e,128filibuster, which affect Congress's effectiveness and, therefore, its power.
Finally, the process that leads to deliberative decision-making is, or at least
can be, strikingly similar between juries and Congress. At trial, jurors hear
from witnesses with opposing interests and ideas, listen to evidence, and seek
to determine the truth-the right from the wrong. Congress, too, through its
committee system, takes testimony from witnesses with contrasting views,
reviews the facts, and decides the proper course to take. And just as a single
juror cannot act alone to reach an ultimate decision, but instead requires either
absolute or near unanimity among her peers, representatives and senators too
must largely act together if Congress is to act. Of course, this description
120. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483-84 & n.10 (2000) ("The judge's
role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found
by the jury.").
121. SeeFED. R. Civ. P.47(a).
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 47(b).
123. Of course, a jury may disregard a judge's instructions. In the civil setting, however, a
jury's decision to ignore the law may result in an alteration or amendment of the judgment. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
125. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
126. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
127. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOc. No. 110-9, R. XXII, at 15-17 (2007),
available at http://rules.senate.gov/senaterules/Rules09l407.pdf.
128. While the filibuster dramatically increases the power of each individual senator, the
device limits the Senate's ability to act as an institution.
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oversimplifies the process. Nevertheless, simply recognizing the similarities
between these two idealized versions of how Congress and juries operate
shows how concerns over inflamed passions and emotional appeals may make
their way into the decision-making process of both institutions.
Why does it matter that Congress and the jury share similar structures and
constraints? How does the fact that Congress and the jury originate from a
common view of popular control over the government factor into the question
of Congress's involvement in amending the Federal Rules of Evidence? The
answer becomes clearer when one remembers that a primary motivation for
enactment of evidentiary rules is distrust of the jury's ability to properly weigh
certain types of evidence before it. The juror-centric exclusionary rules were
drafted despite the compelling-and deeply rooted-belief of the importance
of the jury as the people's representative within the judicial branch, as
protectors of liberty, as "guardians of each others rights."'129 If the Federal
Rules of Evidence are drafted in such a way as to curtail the reach of the jury
by limiting certain types of evidence that they may hear, does it make sense for
Congress, the other representatives of the same people to alter those rules to
widen the jury's reach? The answer, I believe, is no--a conclusion that the
next several Parts support.' 3
0
B. Misleading by Example: Two Illustrations of Congressional Interference
with the Rules of Evidence
An appreciation for the theoretical and practical similarities between
Congress and the jury is useful in understanding why Congress should be
129. Letter from the Federal Farmer No. 15, supra note 115, at 320.
130. Representation theory provides an additional basis for Congress to refrain from
involving itself in the juror-centric Federal Rules of Evidence. Thomas Hobbes's idea of
representation distinguishes between "natural" and "artificial" persons, between "actors" and
"authors." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 105 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1957).
"A natural person is one whose words and actions are considered his own;" an "artificial person is
one whose words or actions are considered those of someone else." HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN,
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 15 (1967). Representatives, we see through Hobbes's
notion, are persons authorized to act on behalf of another; they are, in other words, "artificial"
persons. HOBBES, supra, at 105. When a group of representatives act-when, for example,
Congress amends the Federal Rules of Evidence-they are doing so with authority granted by the
people who elected them. The representatives may be the actors, but the people own the act.
Taking this Hobbesian view, Hannah Pitkin has said: "The representative must act in such a way
that, although he is independent, and his constituents are capable of action and judgment, no
conflict arises between them. He must act in their interest, and this means that he must not
normally come into conflict with their wishes." PITKIN, supra at 166. If one accepts that elected
representatives are often no more than actors committed to taking the actions demanded and
expected by their constituents, then one must also accept that the very concerns that form the
basis for the Federal Rules of Evidence-inflamed passions, emotional responses, and outcome-
oriented decision-making-are likely to manifest themselves in congressional actions. If we are
to continue to attempt to keep juror emotion and passion from interjecting themselves into the
courtroom, we must also limit congressional emotion and passion from interjecting themselves
into the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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restrained by the same rules as those that restrain juries. Still, the most
fundamental rationale for urging Congress to refrain from altering the careful
balance achieved through the Federal Rules of Evidence is that Congress, like
the jury, exhibits the same tendency toward inflamed passions, flawed
reasoning, and outcome-oriented decision-making that the Rules were designed
to prevent in jurors.
The best way to demonstrate that Congress itself is susceptible to the same
(or worse) decision-making-by-passion as a jury is to examine the recent
history of congressional involvement in the Federal Rules. Several times since
the initial enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, Congress has
taken to amending the Rules directly-sometimes in the face of the express
advice and guidance of the Judicial Conference. Two of the most recent
examples are Congress's decision to add Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414,
and 415 in 1994 and to amend Federal Rule of Evidence 704 ten years earlier.
An examination of the process and motivations leading to the enactment of
these Rules provides powerful support for the conclusion that Congress should
limit its role in altering the Federal Rules of Evidence.
1. Rules 413-415: Shock and Awe in the Legislative Battleground
In 1994, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 19 94 .132 Also known as the "Crime
Bill,"' 133 this legislation extended the death penalty to sixty federal offenses,
134
adopted a three-strikes provision for felonies,135 banned the manufacture or
transfer of nineteen semi-automatic weapons or copies, 136 and authorized
nearly $7.9 billion for prison construction,' 37 $8.8 billion to hire 100,000 new
police officers,138 and $377 million for crime prevention programs.' 39 The law
131. The Judicial Conference urged Congress to reconsider its adoption of Rules 413-415,
calling the proposed changes unnecessary and unsupported by empirical evidence. See JUD.
CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER
EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES, 159 F.R.D. 51, 52-53 (1995).
132. Pub. L. No. 103-222, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 8,
12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
133. Kenneth J. Cooper, House Passes $30 Billion Crime Bill, 235 to 195, WASH. POST,
Aug. 22, 1994, at Al.
134. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act §§ 60003-24.
135. Id. § 70001.
136. Id. § 110102.
137. Id. § 20109.
138. Id. § 10003.
139. Id. § 30202.
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also amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to include Rules 413,"' 414,141
140. Federal Rule of Evidence 413 provides:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is
expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such
later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of
evidence under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of sexual assault" means a
crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18,
United States Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an
object and the genitals or anus of another person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the defendant and
any part of another person's body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily
injury, or physical pain on another person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs (1)-
(4).
FED. R. EVID. 413.
141. Federal Rule of Evidence 414 provides:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child
molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses of
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to
which it is relevant.
(b) In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the
attorney for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is
expected to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such
later time as the court may allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of
evidence under any other rule.
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "child" means a person below the age of
fourteen, and "offense of child molestation" means a crime under Federal law or the
law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved-
(I) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States Code, that
was committed in relation to a child;
(2) any conduct proscribed by chapter 110 of title 18, United States Code;
(3) contact between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the
genitals or anus of a child;
(4) contact between the genitals or anus of the defendant and any part of the
body of a child;
(5) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, bodily
injury, or physical pain on a child; or
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and 415.142 These rules essentially supersede Rule 404 and centuries of
common law by rendering admissible evidence of a defendant's past similar
acts in civil or criminal cases involving accusations of sexual assault or child
molestation. 
143
Adoption of these new rules generated fierce opposition in the legal
community. Much of the hostility to Rules 413-415 was based on concerns
that the rules resulted in an unconstitutional denial of due process. 144  A
significant portion of the opposition to Rules 413-415, however, was a result
of the process by which the changes were adopted, the motivations of the new
rules' supporters, and the passions and flawed reasoning that provided the
impetus for the amendments.145 In short, the very concerns that the drafters of
the Federal Rules held for jury decision-making were on display as Congress
enacted Federal Rules 413-415. These new rules disrupted the delicate
balance between admissibility and unfair prejudice, the very fabric of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
a. Process
During the summer of 1994, the presidency of Bill Clinton was floundering,
and President Clinton and the Democratic leadership in Congress desperately
sought to enhance their public standing. The vehicle they settled on was a
(6) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in paragraphs (1)-
(5).
FED. R. EVID. 414.
142. Federal Rule of Evidence 415 provides:
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a
party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child
molestation, evidence of that party's commission of another offense or offenses of
sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be considered as provided in
Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules.
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall disclose the evidence
to the party against whom it will be offered, including statements of witnesses or a
summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered, at least
fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may
allow for good cause.
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of
evidence under any other rule.
FED. R. EVID. 415.
143. See 140 CONG. REc. 15208-09 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
144. See, e.g., id. at 15209 ("Frankly, Mr. Speaker, . . . it raises serious constitutional
questions."); Duane, supra note 9, at 107-08 & n.71 (suggesting violation of constitutional due
process); Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rule of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 57, 58-59 (1995) (contending that Rule 413 impinges due process and equal
protection). These concerns proved to be well-founded, as courts upheld the new rules only after
determining that Rule 403's balance test still applies. See, e.g., United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d
799, 800-02 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1434 (10th Cir. 1998).
145. See discussion infra Part IV.B.I.a.
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crime bill. 146 In early August, however, a coalition of congressional
representatives voted to block the passage of the Democratic legislation. 147
Republican Representative Susan Molinari-who voted with that coalition-
announced that she had done so because the Democratic legislation did not
include her proposal to add Rules 413-415 to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 148
As the Democratic leadership faced increasing pressure to pass a crime bill
prior to the August recess, they looked to Representative Molinari and a
handful of other Republicans for the votes necessary to secure passage. 149
During this "frantic hunt" for votes, congressional negotiators worked nearly
non-stop--not in an effort to improve the legislation, but to logroll their way to
enough votes.' 50 After an exhausting marathon weekend of negotiating-and
in the face of increasing pressure to find a workable compromise-the
Democratic leadership gave in to Rep. Molinari's demand to include Federal
Rules 413-415 in the Crime Bill. 151 Though many Democrats considered the
proposed rules unconstitutional and "ridiculous,"' 52 they included the new
rules in the Crime Bill, a piece of legislation they felt had to be passed for
political reasons. 53
Even at first glance, the process by which Federal Rules 413-415 were
added to the Federal Rules of Evidence is troublesome. Congress took to
adding Rules 413-415 through a game of political posturing, logrolling, and
partisan electoral calculations. 154 The problems of this approach are even more
pronounced when one remembers the deliberative process through which
proposed rules normally advance. Generally, a rule proceeds through no fewer
than five levels of review before it is enacted. 155 Thus, a practice that often
takes three years or more and inspires serious comment and debate within the
legal community was completed after twenty minutes of floor debate in the
United States Senate, after one exhaustive marathon weekend in the House of
Representatives, with no public hearings held on the matter, and with no
serious consideration of the potential ramifications of the changes.
146. Duane, supra note 9, at 96.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id
150. Id. at 96-97.
151. Jill Zuckman, Negotiators in House Outline Deal on Crime Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
21, 1994, at I (cited in Duane, supra note 9, at 96).
152. 140 CONG. REC. 15209 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes). Representative Molinari
responded to this statement by saying, "I think if we talked to any one of the victims or the
parents of the victims whose assailant has been allowed to go free because of a technical
difficulty, they would not deem this measure ridiculous." Id.
153. See Zuckman, supra note 151.
154. See id
155. See Duff, supra note 4.
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b. Inflamed Passions
To the extent there was debate over the wisdom of adding Rules 413-415 to
the Federal Rules of Evidence, supporters of the changes relied on emotional
pleas rather than reasoned argument. A review of the Congressional Record
during the debates surrounding Rules 413-415 reveals that supporters of the
new rules used little more than inflammatory language and appeals to passion
in an effort to secure passage. The preferred modus operandi of these
supporters was the anecdote so horrifying, whether accurate or not, that it
could only be intended to leave the listener wondering why anyone accused of
a sexual crime is not immediately imprisoned for life-skip the trial! A few
examples include:
Senator Bob Dole:
Take the 1988 case of Getz versus State.t 1561  In Getz, the
Supreme Court of Delaware[ 1571  overturned the defendant's
conviction of raping his 11-year-old daughter because evidence that
he had also molested her on other occasions was improperly
admitted. The court went on to hold that the disputed evidence was
impermissible evidence of "character" and could not be admitted
under the State's evidentiary standards. The tragic result: the
defendant walked.J
1581
Similar tragedies have been repeated in other courts and in other
States.
If you turn on television today, if you read the morning
newspaper, or listen to the radio you have heard the sad story of 7-
year-old Megan Kanka, who was recently strangled near her home in
Mercer County, NJ. The police have arrested a twice-convicted sex
offender. According to press reports, the person arrested for this
vicious crime had been sentenced to 10 years in prison, but was
released after serving just 6 years.
Should the killer's prior offense be admitted at trial? You bet.
159
156. 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
157. One should note that all of the anecdotal evidence provided by congressional supporters
of the changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence dealt with cases or crimes handled in state court.
This is because the responsibility for the prosecution of sexual crimes rests principally with the
states. In fact, in the year before Rules 413-415 were added, there were only 155 federal
prosecutions for sexual offenses. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5412, at 463, 473
n.7 (Supp. 2008).
158. As Professor Duane has noted, Mr. Getz did not walk far. Duane, supra note 9, at 101.
Getz was retried and convicted without the objectionable evidence, leading one to question the
supporters' claims of the necessity of this information to secure convictions. Id.
159. 140 CONG. REC. 18929 (1994).
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Representative Molinari:
The People versus Hansen. ' 60 In this case the defendant, Hansen,
was found guilty of inducement of child prostitution and attempted
sexual assault on a child. Hansen had been the subject of a police
investigation after parents complained that he had engaged in
obscene telephone conversations with their pre-teen daughters.
The evidence at the trial included testimony by two other young
girls that the defendant had also solicited sex with them in phone
conversations. However, the appellate court held that admission of
the testimony with the other two girls was reversible error because
this evidence was "unnecessary to establish intent" and hence, in the
court's view, "was without a valid purpose."
Mr. Speaker, this happens time and time again in sexual assault
161
and in child molestation cases ....
Representative Jon Kyl:
On May 4, 1986, Suzanne Harrison, an 18-year-old honor student
in Texas, three weeks away from high school graduation, was
abducted. The next day she was found raped[,] brutally beaten[,] and
strangled to death. She was murdered by a parolee named Jerry
Walter McFadden, a man who calls himself "Animal." McFadden
had been convicted of two 1973 rapes and sentenced to two 15-year
sentences. Paroled in 1978, he was again sentenced to 15 years in
1981 for a three-count crime spree in which he kidnapped, raped, and
sodomized a Texas woman. Released on parole again in July of
1985, even though his record now contained three sex-related
convictions and two prison sentences, McFadden raped and
murdered Suzanne Harrison less than one year later.
1 62)
Tonight we have the opportunity . . . to make a small but
important change to our criminal justice system so that victims of
160. 708 P.2d 468 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
161. 140 CONG. REC. 15208 (1994).
162. Representative Kyl's example is characteristic of the anecdotes offered by supporters of
Federal Rules 413-415 in that they often seem to be using the debate over these three rules of
evidence as a cathartic release of their pent up frustration with the entire criminal justice system.
Here, Representative Kyl's example is horrific, but it is an indictment of the Texas parole system,
not the Federal Rules of Evidence. In fact, the criminal justice system and the Texas Rules of
Evidence appear to have worked without concern in the case of Jerry Walter McFadden: he was
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murder of Suzanne Harrison. He was executed on
October 14, 1999. Michael Graczyk, McFadden Executed for Killing in 1986, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 15, 1999, at 33A.
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sexual abuse and child molestation are not re-victimized once they
bring charges against a perpetrator and enter into the court system.'63
Representative Molinari:
I will cite one more case study and then I will close.
State v. Pace, 275 S.E.2d 254 (N.C. App. 1981). In this case, the
victim, Cynthia Hairston, was an acquaintance of the defendant Pace.
Pace encountered the victim while she was waiting for a bus, and
invited her to wait in his car because it was cold in the bus station.
When she got into the car, he drove to a dead end street, and there
twice raped her and forced her to perform oral sex. The victim
attempted to resist but was limited in her ability to do so by the fact
that she was eight months pregnant at the time.
At the trial of Pace for assaulting Cynthia Hairston, the
government also presented another witness, Vickie Rorie, who
testified that Pace had raped her about two months earlier.
In relation to both incidents, Pace admitted engaging in sex with
the victims at the times in question, but stated that it had been
consensual. This defense was disbelieved, and Pace was convicted.
Because of the law as it stands today, the conviction was reversed
on appeal. The appellate court said the testimony of Vickie Rorie
only "tended to show the bad character of the defendant and his
disposition to commit sex crimes," and hence was deemed
inadmissible, and the case was overtumed. 164
In just these four anecdotes (however incomplete or inaccurate), we have a
father accused of raping his eleven-year-old daughter, a pedophile, the brutal
murder of a young woman, and the rape of a woman eight-months pregnant.
The supporters of Federal Rules 413-415 loaded the debate with these stories
as a way of inflaming the passions of their fellow officeholders and provoking
an emotion-based response.! 6 5 But they did not stop there. In addition to
playing to emotions by offering these accounts of heinous criminals potentially
going free, supporters also layered the debate with passionate cries to protect
163. 140 CONG. REC. 15209 (1994).
164. 140 CONG. REC. 15211 (1994).
165. As Representative William J. Hughes-one of the few public opponents of the new
rules-stated in response to the onslaught of inflammatory rhetoric: "It is very difficult to argue
against something that would suggest that in some way we are going to make it easier for child
molesters and sexual abusers to walk." 140 CONG. REC. 15208 (1994). Representative Hughes
could perhaps afford to lead the House fight against the proposed rules, because he was retiring at
the end of the term. Thomas J. Fitzgerald, State's Senior Congressman Says He'll Retire, N. J.
REcoRD, Jan. 25, 1994, at A3.
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women and children, 166 while attempting to paint sexual assault defendants as
"depraved psychopaths" who will undoubtedly rape again. 167 No reasonable
person can dispute that these are reprehensible crimes for which any alleged
perpetrator should be tried and, if convicted, severely punished. But as the
examples offered by Rules 413-415's supporters illustrate, the proposed
changes were either unrelated to the real problems surrounding the crimes, or
were unnecessary because the defendants were convicted without the past-act
evidence. In fact, proponents of the new rules offered the examples for no
other reason than to evoke outrage and inflame passions.
c. Flawed Reasoning
Perhaps one of the reasons why supporters of Federal Rules 413-415 relied
so heavily on emotional pleas was the sheer absence of a quantifiable need for
the proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence. Representative
Molinari and Senator Dole put forward three basic rationales for singling out
sexual crimes within the Federal Rules of Evidence: (1) sexual crimes are
committed by a "small class of depraved criminals";168 (2) these "depraved
criminals" are more likely than their criminal counterparts to repeat their
acts; 169 and (3) evidence of the defendant's prior bad act in sexual assault cases
166. For example, Representative Molinari declared that passage of the new rules would be
"first and foremost a triumph for the public-for the women who will not be raped and the
children who will not be molested because we have strengthened the legal system's tools for
bringing the perpetrators of these atrocious crimes to justice." 140 CONG. REC. 23602 (1994).
Responding to Democratic criticism that such significant changes to the Federal Rules of
Evidence should advance through the traditional process of the Judicial Conference and adoption
by the Supreme Court, another supporter of the changes, then-Representative Rick Santorum,
stated that he
[could ]not believe what we are saying here tonight is that we are going to allow a
serial rapist, a serial sexual assaulter, a serial child molester the opportunity to continue
without having that relevant evidence brought before the judge because the process of
the Supreme Court and the committee that judges rules of evidence has not gotten
around to dealing with this issue.
140 CONG. REC. 15211 (1994). If the rules had been changed earlier, according to Representative
Kyl, "Suzanne Harrison and thousands of other victims might be alive today." 140 CONG. REC.
15209 (1994). Further, according to Representative Kyl, "[a]llowing the prosecution to bring to
trial similar child molestation crimes of the accused will certainly help these young victims bring
their attacker to justice." Id. at 15210. The new rules should be enacted "[flor the thousands of
individuals who are victims of sexual violence every year." Id.
167. Baker, supra note 9, at 589.
168. David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Offense Cases and Other
Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 15, 24 (1994). Senator Dole and Representative Molinari relied
heavily on the work of David Karp, a Senior Counsel at the Office of Policy Development at the
U.S. Department of Justice during the first Bush Administration. Baker, supra note 9, at 568
n.24. In fact, the article by Mr. Karp cited above was placed into the Congressional Record by
Senator Dole as part of the legislative history of Rules 413-415. 140 CONG. REC. 24799 (1994).
169. See 140 CONG. REC. 24799 (1994) (statement of Sen. Dole); Karp, supra note 168, at
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is necessary to enhance the credibility of the victim's testimony."" In her
detailed analysis of these rationales, Katharine Baker provides both the
quantitative 7  and qualitative' 72 evidence to expose the flawed rationales
offered by Rules 413-415's promoters.
Beyond being wrong about why sexual crimes should be treated differently
under the Rules of Evidence, the law's supporters relied on the supposed need
for such evidence to secure and affirm convictions.1 73 I critique the desire to
simply assist prosecutors earn convictions, apparently at all costs, more fully
below. Here, it is enough to say that supporters pushed this goal despite
abundant evidence disproving that changes to the Rules were necessary to
convict defendants of sexual crimes.i
74
In short, Representative Molinari, Senator Dole, and the other proponents of
Rules 413-415 relied on incorrect assumptions about sex crime defendants, the
nature of such crimes, and the need for changes in the Federal Rules of
Evidence to secure convictions. The supporters provided no empirical data to
support the new Rules; in fact, their arguments in favor of enactment defied the
evidence demonstrating lower recidivism among rapists and a high conviction
rate for such crimes. Indeed, beyond the narrative accounts meant to inflame
passions-accounts that were largely erroneous and misleading-the
proponents of Rules 413-415 offered little more than flawed reasoning to
support the changes.
d. Seeking to Influence Trial Outcomes
Since 1975, changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence have largely been
based on real problems that relate to the application or administration of the
Rules. 175 Supporters of Federal Rules 413-415, however, were explicit in their
170. 140 CONG. REc. 24799 (1994) (statement of Sen. Dole).
171. For example, to demonstrate the falsity of the first rationale, Baker cites to several
national surveys, all of which indicate that sexual assault is anything but an act of a "small class
of depraved criminals." Baker, supra note 9, at 576. One study of6100 college students revealed
that one in twelve men admitted to committing rape. Id. at 576 (citing Mary P. Koss, Hidden
Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher
Education, in 2 RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 1, 11 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988)). Baker
also provides the Bureau of Justice Statistics recidivism rates showing that "only 7.7% of released
rapists [a]re rearrested for rape," while the recidivism rates for other crimes are markedly higher
(33.5% for larcency, 31.9% for burglary, and 24.8% for drug offenses). Id. at 578.
172. Baker presents eight narrative accounts of rape to emphasize the important differences,
not just among the various crimes, but between how society often views that crime and the reality
of the act itself. Id. at 569-73.
173. See 140 CONG. REc. 7817 (1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari).
174. Duane, supra note 9, at 100 (citing government statistics showing an 83 percent
conviction rate at trial for federal prosecution of sexual offenses).
175. See generally 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5008 (giving amendments and
history to the Federal Rules of Evidence). For example, Rule 609 was amended in 1990 to
resolve an ambiguity as to the relationship of Rules 609 and 403 with respect to impeachment of
witnesses other than a defendant. See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee's note. The
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desire to affect the outcome of criminal trials against those accused of sexual
assault or child molestation. Representative Molinari suggested that absent a
change in the rules, the government would be unable to secure convictions of
alleged rapists. 176 Another supporter of Rules 413-415, Representative Bill
McCullum, stated that "there is a problem with the rules of evidence with
regard to the ability to get the kind of background necessary to get rape
convictions in this country."' 177 Representatives Molinari and McCullum made
these pronouncements even though figures from 1992, compiled by the United
States District Courts, showed that the conviction rate for sex offense cases
was 84%. 178  In comparison, the United States government obtained
convictions in 78.2% of larceny and theft cases, in 75.8% of homicide cases,
and in 64.7% of assault cases. 179 Nevertheless, proponents of the changes
clearly wanted the new rules to increase the number of convictions in sexual
assault or child molestation cases, without any apparent concern for the
accuracy of the verdict.18
0
Beyond wanting to ease convictions, supporters of Rules 413-415 also
sought to minimize the number of reversals on appeal. 181  According to
Representative Molinari, "serial rapists and child molesters go free because
current law encourages reversals."' 82 Putting aside the lack of support for this
assertion, a more fundamental problem exists. It is inappropriate for Congress
to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to make a particular outcome more
likely, especially when singling out a specific type of crime. After all, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, more than any other procedural code, very much
affect the outcome of trials.' 83 In part because of this-and also out of the
amendment was in response to the Supreme Court's holding in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989), that felony convictions used to impeach witnesses other than a
defendant could not be excluded under Rule 403. Another example is the degenderization of the
Rules that occurred in 1987 and 1988. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5008, at
344.
176. 140 CONG. REC. 7817 (1994).
177. Id. at 15211.
178. Duane, supra note 9, at 100.
179. Id.
180. In fact, absent from the comments of supporters of Federal Rules 413-415 is any
discussion of the possibility that a sexual assault or child molestation defendant could be wrongly
accused. In the minds of Senator Dole and Representatives Molinari, McCullum, Kyl, and
Santorum, accusation is synonymous with guilt. For a compelling discussion of why such
thinking is misplaced, see Baker, supra note 9, at 581.
181. Again, this goal, in and of itself, may be quite laudable. The problem was that the
drafters of Federal Rules 413-415 saw appellate affirmation of convictions as an end unto itself,
rather than as a process toward ensuring that innocent defendants are not wrongly convicted.
Attempting to prevent reversals on appeal by amending the Rules of Evidence to permit wider
types of evidence ignores one of the very purposes of the Rules and disrupts the balance between
admissibility and unfair prejudice.
182. 140 CONG. REC. 7817 (1994).
183. Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 750 (comments of Gregory Joseph).
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recognition of the importance of a fair trial and need for legitimacy-the
Federal Rules of Evidence have always been aimed at providing a neutral
ground for the determination of the admissibility of evidence. Federal Rules
413-415 are a striking reversal of the effort to ensure fairness and balance
within the Rules. The supporters of these changes were guided primarily by a
desire to ensure more convictions. Congress drafted and encouraged the
enactment of these Rules with an eye toward making it easier to convict those
accused of sexual crimes. Again, there was no discussion from the new rules'
proponents about the right of defendants to receive a fair trial, or of the
potential for convicting innocent persons. Rather, Congress aimed to achieve a
particular result-more convictions regardless of cost.
In passing Rules 413-415, Congress demonstrated just how susceptible it is
to the very characteristics that inspired the adoption of evidentiary rules.
Lawmakers injected their own passions and emotions into the Rules, forsaking
reason at the expense of the Rules themselves.
2. Rule 704(b): Taking Offense at the Insanity Defense
The decision to adopt Rules 413-415 in 1994 was not the first time
Congress bypassed the Judicial Conference and the Rules Enabling Act to
quickly amend the Federal Rules of Evidence. A decade earlier, Congress
passed the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984."' The legislation essentially
adopted the M'Naghten test for insanity, thereby substantially narrowing the
definition of legal insanity and placing the burden on the defendant to prove
the insanity by clear and convincing evidence. 185 In addition, the law amended
Federal Rule of Evidence 704 to include subsection (b), which restricts the
ability of experts to testify regarding the mental state or condition of a
defendant in criminal proceedings.' 86 The impetus for this legislation was the
1981 assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan and the subsequent
acquittal by reason of insanity of John Hinckley, Jr. During Hinckley's trial
184. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000)).
185. Named after the guidelines established by the House of Lords in M'Naghten's Case,
(1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.). The standard provides that
1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the time of the offense;
2) the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect;
3) that caused the defendant either:
(a) not to know the nature and quality of the act he or she committed; or
(b) knowing the quality of the act, nonetheless not to know that the act was wrong.
Henry F. Fradella, From Insanity to Beyond Diminished Capacity: Mental Illness and Criminal
Excuse in the Post-Clark Era, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 7, 16-17 (2007).
186. Subsection (b) of Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant
in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or
did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged
or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
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for the shooting that seriously injured President Reagan, Press Secretary James
Brady, and two others, a number of expert witnesses testified as to Hinckley's
ability to form the mental state specific to the crimes he was alleged to have
committed. 187 These witnesses, couching their opinions in the relevant legal
terms of the day, offered competing analyses as to whether Hinckley was
mentally sane. After three days of deliberation, the jury acquitted
Hinckley. 189 The jury's finding that Hinckley was not guilty by reason of
insanity prompted sharp public outrage. 190 Public opinion and the White
House placed significant pressure on Congress to take quick action.
191
Congress responded to that pressure. Declaring a need to "eliminate the
confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly
contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier
of fact," 192 Congress took the step of amending Federal Rule 704 without
significant debate, an opportunity for public comment or consideration, or the
benefit of hearing from the legal community.
a. Process
While the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) was not as
controversial as the adoption of Rules 413-415, the process surrounding
approval of the change still proves troublesome. The most obvious concern is
that in enacting Rule 704(b), Congress responded to political considerations by
making changes to address perceived problems within the Rules. Of course, to
quote Justice Holmes, "hard cases make bad law." 193 Here, based on a trial
that garnered national attention and an outcome that both the public and its
elected officials found shocking (and probably did not understand), Congress
chose to amend the Rules of Evidence. In other words, Congress was
responding to inflamed passions and pressure from within the political
environment when it altered the Federal Rules to include Rule 704(b).
This leads to another troublesome aspect of the effort to amend Rule 704:
Congress's actions were in response to a single unsatisfactory outcome that
187. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR.
64-68 (1984).
188. Id. at 63-72.
189. Rita R. Carroll, Insanity Defense Reform, 114 MIL. L. REv. 183, 184 (1986).
190. CAPLAN, supra note 187, at 116; see also Carroll, supra note 189, at 184 & n.9
(discussing the fact that five of the Hinckley jurors testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Law just three days after the verdict and quoting several
senators expressing frustration with the Hinckley verdict).
191. See Herbert H. Denton, President Leans Toward Review of Insanity Defense, WASH.
POST, July 2, 1982, at A4; Peter Perl, Public That Saw Reagan Shot Expresses Shock at the
Verdict, WASH. POST, June 23, 1982, at A8.
192. S. REP.NO. 98-225, at 230 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412.
193. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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would rarely, if ever, be repeated. 94  Figures from 1981, the year of the
attempted assassination, showed that only four federal defendants were
acquitted of charges based on a successful insanity defense. 195 This was hardly
a pressing matter. Further, one need only examine the Insanity Defense
Reform Act in its entirety to recognize that Congress's purpose in changing
Rule 704 was to make it harder for defendants to escape conviction by
claiming insanity.' 96 The Federal Rules of Evidence are not the appropriate
vehicle for pursuing such outcome-driven goals.
b. Flawed Reasoning
As with any legislative idea inspired by political and emotional passions and
pushed through relatively quickly, the reasoning behind Federal Rule of
Evidence 704(b) is also flawed. Two justifications were offered in support of
subsection (b). 197  The first is that a jury may not be capable of rationally
deciding between experts who offer competing conclusions as to the legal
mental state of defendants.' The feared consequence of such confusion is
that the jury would simply adopt the opinion of one of the experts without
giving independent rational thought to the matter. The expert would, in
essence, be usurping the jury's function. 199
194. One could argue that Congress's motivation was, as the Senate Report stated,
eliminating the "confusing spectacle of expert witnesses contradicting each other as to the
ultimate legal issue." S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230. The difficultly with accepting this explanation
is that the proposed change to Rule 704 addresses only issues involving mental health testimony
in criminal trials. If Congress were truly concerned about competing experts regarding the
ultimate issue, there was no reason to limit the amendment to mental health testimony and no
reason to restrict its application to criminal trials. Another way to expose the true motivation of
the proponents of the change to Rule 704 is simply to ask the question: had Hinckley been found
guilty, would Congress have amended the Rule? If the answer is no, the amendment must have
been inspired, at least in part, to influence the outcome in favor of future convictions.
195. CAPLAN, supra note 187, at 104. The number of acquittals at the state level was
similarly low. See id at 102-08.
196. 1 do not intend this as a criticism of Congress's effort to make insanity defenses more
difficult. As noted above, Congress was largely codifying the M'Naghten standard for proving
legal insanity that had been in existence for over a century. In fact, the policy goals underlying
the bulk of the Insanity Defense Reform Act may be sensible and, moreover, are undoubtedly
within the purview of Congress. Rather, the problem is that Congress abandoned the standard
process for amending the Federal Rules of Evidence and did so based on emotional
considerations and with an outcome-driven motivation.
197. 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 6282, at 365 (1997).
198. Id § 6282, at 369; see also United States v. Austin, 981 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir.
1992) (stating that the rule is intended to "prevent[] a confusing 'battle of the experts'); United
States v. Kristiansen, 901 F.2d 1463, 1466 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that the "purpose of rule
704(b) is to prevent a jury adjudicating an insanity claim from becoming thoroughly confused by
medical experts' testimony about the ultimate legal issues").
199. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 197, § 6282, at 369; see also United States v.
DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159, 1164 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that Rule 704(b) "recognizes that
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This, however, is hardly a compelling justification for subsection (b). Juries
will still be subjected to competing opinions on such matters because the Rule
simply confines the expert to offering opinion testimony through medical
terminology rather than through the language of legal conclusions.
20 0
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there is no articulated reason for why
subsection (b) is limited to mental health testimony. In fact, while the subject
of insanity or intent may be complex and potentially confusing matters for a
jury to grasp, that is the very reason for expert testimony. 20 1  Indeed,
subsection (b) does nothing to solve the problems associated with juror
confusion over competing expert testimony and instead makes the situation all
the more frustrating for jurors by not allowing experts to complete the
analysis.
202
The second justification offered by supporters of subsection (b) is that
psychiatrists and psychologists are experts in their respective fields, not in the
law. 203 This rationale is, at least on its face, more convincing than the fear of
juror confusion over competing expert testimony. 204  Opinions by medical
experts on the ultimate legal issues often take the form of simple "parrot[ing
of] the legal formulas for sanity or intent"205 and are therefore outside the
scope of a psychiatrist's and psychologist's expertise.20 6 The problem with
placing too much reliance on this justification for subsection (b) is that to do so
expert testimony concerning a defendant's mental state poses a uniquely heightened danger of
intruding on the jury's function").
200. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 197, § 6282, at 369.
201. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
202. Capra, supra note 48, at 696-97.
203. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 197, § 6282, at 370; see also S. REP. No. 98-225, at
230-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13. The Senate Report relied on a
statement by the American Psychiatric Association for the policy rationale:
[1]t is clear that psychiatrists are experts in medicine, not the law. As such, it is clear
that the psychiatrist's first obligation and expertise in the courtroom is to "do
psychiatry," i.e., to present medical information and opinion about the defendant's
mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for his medical-
psychiatric conclusions. When, however, "ultimate issue" questions are formulated by
the law and put to the expert witness who must then say "yea" or "nay," then the expert
witness is required to make a leap in logic. He no longer addresses himself to medical
concepts but instead must infer or intuit what is in fact unspeakable, namely, the
probable relationship between medical concepts and legal or moral constructs such as
free will. These impermissible leaps in logic made by expert witnesses confuse the
jury.
Id. (alteration in original).
204. 29 WRIGHT& GOLD, supra note 197, § 6282, at 370.
205. Idat371.
206. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230; 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 197, § 6282, at 371; see
also United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1241 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[l]t is evident that Rule
704(b) was designed to avoid the confusion and illogic of translating the 'medical concepts'
relied upon by 'psychiatrists and other mental health experts' into legal conclusions.").
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essentially concedes the superfluous nature of the amendment.20 7  If
psychiatrists and psychologists are not experts in the law, then their testimony
relating to such issues would not assist the fact finder. As such, the testimony
is not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.208 While given the
emotional and political spark that ignited the push for a change in insanity, it
may be "no surprise that Congress would be unwilling to rely on the efficacy
of a general provision like Rule 702, '' 209 but that is hardly a justifiable reason
for amending the Federal Rules.
c. Unintended Consequences
Finally, as is often the case with such efforts, the addition of subsection (b)
to Rule 704 has had dramatic unintended consequences. For example, though
Congress was clearly focused on the perceived problems of medical experts
testifying regarding legal conclusions, the amendment to the Rule was drafted
so that its reach extended beyond mental health experts. The Rule, therefore,
has been applied to non-medical testimony, such as law enforcement officers
offering expert testimony as to whether a defendant acted with the intent or
knowledge required to commit the crime charged.2  For example, prior to
subsection (b)'s enactment, police officers routinely offered expert testimony
as to whether a defendant possessing a certain amount of illegal drugs
possessed those drugs with the intent to distribute them.2 1 1  Following the
adoption of subsection (b), the admissibility of such testimony is less
certain. 2 12 Courts have split on the question of whether Rule 704(b) applies to
207. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 197, § 6282, at 371.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 372.
210. See Dana Hassin, How Much is Too Much? Rule 704(b) Opinions on Personal Use vs.
Intent to Distribute, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 667, 677-80 (2001).
211. See Deon J. Nossel, Note, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Expert Testimony by Law
Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231-32 & nn.4-5 (1993)
(discussing the federal prosecutor's reliance on expert law enforcement testimony and citing
several pre-704(b) cases, such as United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Jones, 605 F. Supp. 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial
court erred by admitting police officer testimony that the quantity of crack cocaine in a person's
possession was consistent with an intent to distribute); United States v. Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419,
422 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that trial court erred under Rule 704(b) by permitting a police
officer to give expert testimony that, based on the packaging of the cocaine, the defendant
intended to distribute the drugs). Still, most courts have concluded that Rule 704(b) does not bar
such testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854-55 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The
rule does not prevent the expert from testifying to facts or opinions from which the jury could
conclude or infer the defendant had the requisite mental state."); United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d
445, 454 (7th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the testimony "merely assisted the jury," as opposed to
deciding for them); United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1031 (1 1th Cir. 1988) ("[Tlhe expert
left this inference for the jury to draw. He did not expressly 'state [the] inference."' (alteration in
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non-mental health experts. 213 The reason for this conflict rests with the limited
legislative history behind the change and that history's apparent contradiction
of the text of the Rule. The legislative history, which primarily consists only
of a two-page Senate report on the rule change, indicates that Congress was
concerned solely with mental health experts proffering opinions as to whether
a defendant's mental state met a certain legal standard. 14 Nonetheless, the
language of the Rule extends beyond the testimony of mental health experts
and was instead drafted to include any expert testifying regarding a defendant's
mental state or condition.15 This language has led to problems of
interpretation for courts, as some struggle to close the gap between the text of
Rule 704(b) and the rather clear motivation for the rule's enactment. 216
The issues associated with applying Rule 704(b)-and the problem of
unintended consequences-extend beyond just difficulties for the court. Take,
for example, United States v. West.2 1  There, the defendant was charged with
bank robbery and his defense was insanity. 218 A court-appointed psychiatrist
examined the defendant and concluded that: (1) he was suffering from
"'schizoaffective disorder,"' a severe mental disease, but that (2) the defendant
"'understood the wrongfulness of his actions' when he robbed the bank.219
The defendant's counsel cleverly sought to have the first finding (the medical
disorder) admitted, while keeping the expert's conclusions as to the second
finding (the ultimate issue) out.22° The government sought to keep the entire
psychiatric testimony out under Rule 704(b) and the trial court agreed.22' The
Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Rule 704(b) rendered inadmissible
only the ultimate conclusion that the defendant knew right from wrong.22 2 The
court of appeals held that Rule 704(b) did not operate to exclude the remainder
of the psychiatrist's testimony regarding the mental disease. 223  This
"outrageous" result would not have occurred absent Congress's enactment of
224
subsection (b).
original)); United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127, 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[Tlhe responses of the
expert were... focused on the evidence, rather than addressing the ultimate issue .... ").
213. Compare United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1326, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (limiting
Rule 704(b)'s application to mental health experts), with Boyd, 55 F.3d at 672 (applying Rule
704(b) to non-mental health testimony), and Richard, 969 F.2d at 855 (same).
214. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 230-31 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13.
215. See 29 WRJGHT & GOLD, supra note 197, § 6283, at 375-76.
216. Id § 6285, at 388.
217. 962 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1992).
218. Id. at 1244.
219. Id. at 1245.
220. Id at 1245, 1247.
221. Id. at 1245.
222. Id. at 1246-47.
223. Id. at 1247-48.
224. Id. at 1245 (quoting the trial judge). More commonly, the Rule has been applied at the
defendant's expense. See, e.g., United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 2000)
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Thus, just as with Rules 413-415, the examination of Rule 704(b) shows
that when Congress acts to directly amend the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
basis for the change is likely to be emotion-driven and outcome-oriented.
Additionally, Rule 704(b) demonstrates another added problem of direct
congressional involvement in the Rules: such action is typically done without
much consideration and without much opportunity for input from the
experienced legal community. Congressionally mandated changes therefore
often result in poorly drafted, ill-considered rules that leave a trail of
225
unintended consequences.
As these two examples show, Congress is at least as susceptible to emotion-
based decisions as are juries. Indeed, the approach taken in amending the
Federal Rules of Evidence to include Rules 413-415 and subsection (b) to
Rule 704 conclusively demonstrates the problematic nature of congressional
involvement in amending juror-centric rules. A fear of juries relying on
inflamed passions, misused or ignored evidence, and outcome-oriented
decision-making to render verdicts contributed significantly to the
development of the evidentiary rules. Yet these same objectionable bases for
decision-making pervade congressional action on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and there is no reason to believe that the process through which
Congress directly amends the Rules of Evidence will become any less
politicized or emotion-driven. The only way to preserve the integrity of the
careful compromise between admissibility and fairness is for Congress to
refrain from interfering with the Rules absent recommendations from the
Judicial Conference and its committees.
C. Taking Away a Defendant's Fair Trial
Besides the theoretical and practical similarities between Congress and juries
and the recent illustrations of congressional evidentiary rulemaking-by-
passion, another reason exists for Congress to refrain from amending the juror-
centric Rules of Evidence. The balance between admissibility of evidence and
preventing unfair prejudice that the juror-centric Federal Rules seek to achieve
is directly related to the desire to ensure that defendants receive fair trials. The
Rules therefore generally exclude evidence that may inspire juries to convict a
defendant based on anything other than the facts before them. 
26
(upholding the exclusion of expert testimony regarding results of defendant's polygraph test);
United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1998) (barring defendant's expert's
testimony regarding defendant's intent to defraud the Internal Revenue Service).
225. A compounding problem is that rules directly adopted by Congress are viewed as
somehow above reproach by the Advisory Committee, so that once a change has been made by
Congress, it will almost certainly take another act of Congress to correct any unintended
consequences. See Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of[Evidence] Rulemaking," 53
HASTINGs L.J. 843, 860-61 (2002).
226. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); IA WIGMORE, supra
note 85, § 58.2, at 1212; see also Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation
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Of course, evidence excluded under these Rules is, by definition, relevant. 27
For this reason, drafters of the Rules and the courts have taken particular care
in achieving a balance between admissibility and unfair prejudice. Changes to
the Rules disturb that balance. When that disruption follows thoughtful
analysis and consideration, as it must when done through the Advisory
Committee, and when careful attention is paid to the rights of defendants,
changes to the juror-centric rules may be appropriate. Congressional action in
this area, however, has always been inspired by a desire to disrupt that balance
in favor of the government in prosecution of defendants. Although that may
not always be the result, as demonstrated by the effects of Rule 704(b) on the
prosecution of intent-required drug crimes, when Congress seeks to assist
prosecutors at the expense of defendants, that objective will nearly always be
accomplished. This aim not only raises constitutional concerns over whether
defendants can receive a fair trial, but harms the perceived legitimacy of the
criminal justice system. 28 After all, few members of Congress stand up for
defendants' rights.229  And, as public-choice theory instructs, legislation is
becoming more and more interest-group driven. 23  Few interest groups-at
least with much clout on Capitol Hill-make the rights of defendants a top
priority. Even if such a group did exist, it is hard to imagine a member of
Congress paying much attention to it given the electoral benefits associated
with being perceived as tough on crime.
Further, more than any other set of rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence may
affect the outcome of a trial.2 32  This is especially true of the juror-centric
Concern, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 979 (arguing that character-evidence causes a jury to
lower the burden of proof because it does not like the defendant).
227. If the evidence is not relevant, no exclusionary rule is necessary. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
228. See, e.g., Michelson, 335 U.S. at 475-76; United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1430-
33 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that "Rule 413 raises... serious constitutional due process" concerns,
but that the Rule passed muster because the protections of Rule 403 still applied); see generally
Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen Stigall, "Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?": How
Sexual Propensity Evidence Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (1996)
(examining the constitutionality of Rules 413-415, and concluding that the Rules "represent
popular political fads which Congress enacted in order to satisfy the fears of constituents, without
regard to protections afforded to defendants by the Constitution").
229. Representative William Hughes and Senator Joe Biden spoke up strongly against Rules
413-415, but these exceptions prove the rule. Representative Hughes was retiring from Congress
at the end of the 1993-1995 term, see supra note 165, and Senator Biden has not faced serious
opposition since his first election to the Senate in 1972. See Mike Mclntire & Serge F.
Kovaleski, An Everyman on the Trail, With Perks at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at Al.
230. Paul Kirgis, A Legisprudential Analysis of Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of
Evidence Should Not Be Codified-But Privilege Law Should Be, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 809-
810 & n.5 (2005) (citing Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987)).
231. See supra note 165 (statement of Rep. Hughes). Few elected officials want to be
attacked as soft on crime-an accusation more likely to be made (and to stick), if the lawmaker
takes up the cause of criminal defendants.
232. Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 750 (comments of Gregory Joseph).
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Rules because they tend to prevent otherwise admissible evidence from
reaching the jury. Therefore, congressionally imposed changes to the Rules
are more likely to be inspired by a desire to influence the outcome of criminal
trials. Concerns over unconstitutional deprivations of due process and the
questions about the legitimacy of criminal trials can only be avoided if
Congress refrains from involving itself in the juror-centric Rules of Evidence.
V. ANTICIPATING CRITICISMS
A call for Congress to refrain from legislating in an area that is
unquestionably within its purview will certainly generate criticism. In
anticipation, I offer a brief response.
Undoubtedly, the first, loudest, and most obvious reaction this Article may
generate is that it is hopelessly naive to believe Congress will voluntarily limit
its role in the Federal Rules of Evidence. There is certainly some truth to that,
but it may not be as unrealistic as one may at first think. Even during the
debate surrounding the enactment of Rules 413-415, there were congressional
voices urging disapproval of the amendments because they had not advanced
through the process envisioned by the Rules Enabling Act.234 Further, some of
the most recent proposals in Congress relating to the Rules avoid offering a
specific amendment and instead direct the Judicial Conference to study
particular areas of concern. 235 And, of course, the Rules Enabling Act itself
was a creation of Congress. These facts indicate that there is at least some
233. As a starting point, I should note it is undeniably true that Congress can amend the
Federal Rules of Evidence as it sees fit, as long as those changes do not result in an
unconstitutional denial of due process or equal protection. I am not arguing that Congress cannot
amend the Rules of Evidence. Instead, I seek to make the case that Congress should not amend
the Rules because congressional action involving evidentiary rules, especially those that are juror-
centric, is an affront to the very purposes the Rules serve.
234. 140 CONG. REc. 15208 (1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes). Additionally, Democrats
included within the legislation adding Rules 413-415 a provision to keep the new rules from
taking effect immediately. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 5411, at 454. The Judicial
Conference was given 150 days to study and offer an opinion as to the new rules. Id. If the
Judicial Conference took no action or opposed the changes, Rules 413-415 would not take effect
for 150 days. Id. One can speculate that this provision was added to soothe the concerns of
Democrats who believed they would be able to return to this issue after the 1994 elections and
with the added weight of the Judicial Conference opposition behind them. Id. Democrats,
obviously, did not anticipate losing control of both chambers of Congress as a result of that
November's elections. Nevertheless, the decision to include a request for Judicial Conference
comment and the 150-day stay of implementation are further demonstrations that many
lawmakers prefer the process established by the Rules Enabling Act to that of direct
congressional involvement in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
235. See, e.g., Gang Abatement and Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1582, 110th Cong. § 205
(2007) (calling for the Judicial Conference to study the necessity and desirability of amending
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b) related to hearsay exceptions for wrongdoing); Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. § 214 (2006) (directing the
Judicial Conference to study amending the Rules to include marital communication and adverse
spousal privileges).
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recognition on Capitol Hill that the best approach toward amending the Federal
Rules of Evidence travels through the Judicial Conference and its
committees.
236
Another likely criticism of this article is that many of the changes to the
Federal Rules of Evidence are policy-driven and that Congress, not the Judicial
Conference or its offshoots, is the appropriate vehicle for enacting policy
preferences. There is some merit to this point as well. The problem, however,
is that the only issues that seem to draw Congress's interest with regard to the
Rules are those for which lawmakers can score electoral points at the expense
of groups lacking political support or other resources to promote their own
* 237interests.  Furthermore, Congress is often seeking to amend the Rules to
upend policy pronouncements and legal protections that go back centuries.
Just as the courts pay more respect to long-established precedents, especially
those preserving basic rights, Congress, too, should give more consideration to
the motivations and concepts on which the Federal Rules of Evidence are
founded. Then, perhaps, lawmakers will defer to the experts in the field-the
drafters and the Judicial Conference-rather than attempting to reshape the
Rules of Evidence for political gain.
One final anticipated criticism that falls along a similar line is that the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and the Judicial Conference have
failed to properly maintain the Rules.238 Critics contend that the Committee's
conservative approach to amending the Rules has left many problems
unaddressed and that a process that takes over two years to complete is simply
too slow to meet the need for changes to the Rules.239 These may be valid
criticisms of the Advisory Committee, but do not affect my analysis for several
reasons. First, as these very critics acknowledge, Congress has shown little
interest in addressing real problems with the Rules and instead has focused on
concerns that are politically motivated.24° Congress, therefore, is probably less
inclined than even the Advisory Committee to correct technical or fundamental
weaknesses in the Rules. Nor, for that matter, are lawmakers particularly well
positioned for learning about and investigating perceived problems within the
Rules. The Advisory Committee, on the other hand, is made up of trial
lawyers and judges who are better placed to hear from the legal community
and the courts if problems arise relating to the Rules of Evidence. Lastly, a
five-step process that takes considerable time and careful analysis is preferable
236. Moreover, I am not suggesting that Congress pass a law restricting its involvement in
amending the Rules of Evidence. Instead, my goal is much more modest. I hope that the next
time Congress considers directly implementing changes to the Rules of Evidence, the
considerations raised here will influence the debate and provide support to those who argue that
the Rules are too important to be the subject of congressional impulses.
237. See Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 750 (comments of Paul Rice).
238. See Rice, supra note 44, at 819-25.
239. Politics of Evidence Symposium, supra note 6, at 739-40 (comments of Paul Rice).
240. Id. at 741-42.
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to quick, election- or emotion-driven decisions when the issue involves the
delicate balance between admissibility and preventing unfair prejudice.
This is just a sampling of the criticisms this Article will undoubtedly
generate. Still, given the juror-centric foundation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the theoretical concept of representation and the jury, and the recent
history of congressional interference with the Rules, the case for congressional
disengagement from the Federal Rules of Evidence proves strong.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Evidence are more than just a procedural guide to
admitting evidence at trial. Rather, these rules represent the law's deeply
rooted ambivalence about the role of the jury. On the one hand, we believe-
as our Founders did-in the importance of maintaining the people's voice
within the judiciary. The jury's historical importance in protecting individual
liberties and rights cannot be forgotten. On the other hand, fears that juries are
susceptible to appeals to emotion and illogical passion are often justified. The
Federal Rules of Evidence reconcile these competing concepts by establishing
a delicate balance between giving the jury as much information as possible and
excluding evidence that may inflame the jury's passions and unfairly prejudice
a party. This balance, however, is threatened by congressional involvement in
the Rules. Lawmakers have demonstrated an inclination toward emotion-
driven amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence. This is hardly surprising
because juries and Congress are drawn from the same people and represent
common constituencies.
To preserve the balance achieved through years of thoughtful analysis of the
Rules, Congress should refrain from directly amending the Federal Rules of
Evidence. I am under no illusion that such a suggestion will immediately take
hold of congressional sensibilities and prevent further attempts at direct
amendments to the Rules. I do hope, however, that the arguments put forward
here will assist those who seek to safeguard the Rules and prevent them from
becoming a vehicle for scoring easy political points at the expense of that
important balance between admissibility and unfair prejudice.
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